Anthropic and Theorem use Claude to prove crash-freedom in 123 open-source libraries

For the CISO of a mid-size US bank

Anthropic said on Oct. 22 that, working with Theorem, it used Claude to write formal proofs at the RISC-V assembly level for 123 open-source libraries.1

Anthropic said formal verification has historically required years of expert effort, and that LLMs can now produce such proofs at large scale; as an example it cited the seL4 kernel, which took two person-years to implement and 20 person-years to verify.1 To define what "correct" means for the open-source libraries it sought to prove, Anthropic said it automatically converted their preexisting compilable test suites into a spec encoding the rule "this test suite always passes," using a general model of executing RISC-V-compiled binaries on Linux; for this project it started with fuzz tests, and the resulting spec says the fuzz test will not crash for any input less than 64 MB.1

Claude proved the programs always exit normally, with no memory-safety errors or failing assertions, for every input under 64 MB and every modeled Linux response and memory layout, according to Anthropic.1

The proofs assume the program runs as a single-threaded static binary with a fixed memory budget on a RISC-V CPU using Linux, Anthropic said.1

Over a few weeks, Claude patched the bugs it found and proved no crashes on any input up to 64 MB for 239 entry points across 123 OSS-Fuzz libraries, and Anthropic said it found bugs that had eluded detection for years despite trillions of test runs.1

According to Anthropic's appendix, Claude wrote about one billion lines of Rocq proofs, of which about 180 million were part of proofs that passed the checker; a finished proof runs to about 600,000 lines, and checking one can take 30 minutes to several hours of CPU time.2

Why it matters

If proofs become cheaper, banks and fintechs could start asking software vendors for machine-checked guarantees on critical components, not only test results. The guarantees are narrow: they cover the stated assumptions and only the behavior the tests define as correct, so buyers should read the assumptions before the conclusion.

What’s next

Anthropic said Theorem is offering to run the same pipeline for other open-source projects and is publishing a Claude skill for developers to verify their own code; it did not give a date.1

From the brief

Our take. Verifying seL4 took ten times as long as building it; Claude just proved security properties across 123 libraries. Ask core and fintech vendors for machine-checked proofs, then ask what the spec was, because here it was the test suite.

Action. Third-party risk: Add vendor security review questions asking for formal proofs, the spec used, and the stated assumptions behind them.

What our records say

Claude is sold to banks as seats and API access, directly and through cloud marketplaces, and in 2026 Anthropic added embedded engineering with Goldman Sachs and FIS, restricted Mythos access for a few large banks, and a services firm co-founded with Goldman Sachs.1

  1. Claude: AI programme summary

From our records

Sources

  1. Primary sourceLLMs are making formal software verification feasible at a much larger scale \ Anthropic Anthropic
  2. Primary sourcehttps://www-cdn.anthropic.com/files/4zrzovbb/website/6867eadf760258fa8b42a504600cd3c036d16358.pdf Anthropic